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Preface
This is the third publication in the series of Right to Education
Primers, which is devoted to elucidating key dimensions of the
right to education, the respect of all human rights in education, as
well as enhancing human rights through education. Primer No. 1,
entitled Removing Obstacles on the Road to the Right to Education,
has had as the point of departure the need to dismantle prevalent
misconceptions which impede effective recognition of the right to
education. Primer No. 2 has addressed its cardinal requirement,
ensuring free and compulsory education for all, and highlighted
the gap between this minimal global human rights norm and
reality. It has pointed out that these minimal requirements are not
yet in place in at least 58 countries.
This publication summarizes governmental human rights
obligations in education, structured into a simple 4-A scheme –
making education available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable.
Primer No. 4 follows and is devoted to the orientation, contents
and methods of education; it is entitled Human Rights in
Education as Prerequisite for Human Rights Education. The
importance of linking governmental human rights obligations
with global development finance strategies – encompassing aid
and debt relief – is addressed in Primer No. 5. It is entitled Is the
World Bank Moving towards the Right to Education? It argues that
human rights obligations are both individual and collective hence
the right to education should be – but is not – recognized in
global economic, fiscal, or education strategies. The multitude of
issues which have to be described and analyzed is being addressed
step-by-step hence five more Right to Education Primers are
planned for the year 2001.
This series of publications complements my work within
the United Nations as the Special Rapporteur on the right to
education of the Commission on Human Rights. The Com-
mission has recently started dealing with economic, social and
cultural rights in earnest and this area is not, as yet, widely
known. These publications aim to facilitate outreach for the
right to education by presenting the essential facets of the
process whereby human rights can and should be
mainstreamed in education. This entails the full recognition of
the right to education, safeguards for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in education, and the adaptation of schooling
to enhancing human rights through education.
The publications are part of the emerging public access
resource centre on the right to education at the Raoul Wallen-
berg Institute of Lund University. It is being developed to
broaden interest for the right to education and to increase
knowledge about it by making the essential material available in
a systematic manner, free of charge. Alongside publications, this
resource centre includes background information needed to map
out the international and domestic legal frameworks of the right
to education. This encompasses excerpts from the relevant
international treaties which guarantee the right to education,
information on their ratifications and reservations which
delineate international legal commitments for each country,
constitutional guarantees of the right to education, information
on international and domestic institutions which provide
remedy for human rights violations within education, important
court cases and decisions of national human rights commissions
concerning the right to education and human rights in
education. This information will be accessible at www.right-to-
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education.org.  as of 15 March 2001. This website will also
include full texts of the publications and they will also be sent
to those who cannot access them on-line.
This resource centre is being developed to augment my
work as the Special Rapporteur on the right to education of
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Special
Rapporteurs are appointed by the Chairman of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, subsequent to the Commission’s
decision to create a specific mandate. The particular person’s
expertise in a specific field, in my case a long track record of
working on economic and social rights, the human rights of
women and the rights of the child, seemed to have been
decisive. My mandate on the right to education was created by
the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1998/33 of
17 April 1998 and I was appointed in August 1998.
The Commission’s decision to appoint a Special Rapporteur
on the right to education originated in a widely shared assess-
ment that economic, social and cultural rights had been
neglected, if not marginalized. The text of the resolution
whereby my mandate was created, typically for economic and
social rights, was inexact on the contours of the mandate1  as a
consequence of the need to generate and sustain consensus
within the Commission. Advancing human rights is a process
and the initial definition of an agenda for the future is narrow
and cautious, to be broadened and deepened as work progresses.
Much work is needed to redress the previous neglect of the right
to education. Much too little can be done within the United
Nations, where the right to education is one out of very many
issues on the agenda, thus the necessity of providing external
academic and professional input in the deliberations and
evolving policies of the Commission on Human Rights.
My work on the right to education therefore extends far
beyond my role as the Special Rapporteur and encompasses
research, teaching and training at the Raoul Wallenberg
Institute at Lund University. The two are closely linked.
Special Rapporteurship is an honorary function, entailing
much unpaid work and a great deal of battling to assert and
defend the right to education, particularly for all the children
who do not know that such a right exists, least of all that they
should be enjoying it. The logic of human rights work is that
rights are denied and violated hence the essential task is to
expose and oppose denials and violations. By no stretch of
imagination could one imagine deniers and violators sitting
back and applauding. Special Rapporteurs thus continue in
their existing jobs so as to remain financially and
organizationally independent. Where their professional and
academic work can be molded to support their UN work, as
my case has fortunately been, much can be done.
Working as a Special Rapporteur encompasses three
tracks: annual reports provide a summarized overview of
relevant developments worldwide, country missions are carried
1 The Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1998/33 of 17 April 1998
mandated me to (i) Report on the status, throughout the world, of the progressive
realization of the right to education, including access to primary education, and the
difficulties encountered in the implementation of this right; (ii) Promote assistance to
Governments for urgent plans of action to secure the progressive implementation of the
principle of compulsory primary education free of charge for all; (iii) Focus on gender,
in particular the situation and needs of the girl child, and to promote the elimination of
all forms of discrimination in education; (v) Develop regular dialogue with actors such
as UNESCO or UNICEF, and with financial institutions, such as the World Bank.
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out to examine the pattern of problems in situ, while obstacles
or alleged violations are tackled through correspondence with
the respective governments. My three annual and two mission
reports (Uganda and England) are available on the homepage
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(www.unhchr.ch)  in English, French and Spanish, as are
resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and other
pertinent documents. My UN reports are also available at
www.right-to-education.org.
UN reports are limited to 28 pages and so a great deal of
economizing is needed to cover all pertinent issues; the
coverage is necessarily superficial. There is only one annual
report while funding available for missions effectively permits
only one every second year. The style in which these reports
are written does not facilitate easy reading. Therefore, this
series of publications addresses each important dimension of
the right to education in turn. The publications are kept
short, the multitude of legal information is provided
separately so as to facilitate easy reading, and real-life
examples are used as much as possible to exemplify the
relevance of the human rights approach to education. They
are circulated in a limited number of copies to stimulate
discussion and invite critical comment. All comments and
suggestions are thus welcome.
K. Tomaševski
Lund, 18 January 2001
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Introduction
A well-established adage posits that no right can exist without a
remedy. This truism is sometimes forgotten for economic and
social rights, including the right to education, thereby divorcing
them from their grounding in law and transforming them into a
secular religion. Such experiments are not likely to take root, nor
are they likely to be beneficial for the human rights cause, unless
the core of human rights is preserved and strengthened – rights
entail corresponding obligations and ought to be accompanied
by access to remedy for alleged denials and violations.
The conceptual counterpart of human rights are then
governmental obligations. Governments are individually
obliged to secure human rights for their own population. They
cannot be held legally responsible for violating human rights
in other countries and international development co-operation
is perceived as human-rights promoting, or at worst neutral. It
often facilitates the realization of human rights, it is almost
never neutral, while it can also harm human rights. On the
one hand, governments of developing countries can be
pressurized into violating or denying human rights through
conditions for development finance. Trade union freedoms of
teachers can be denied so as to keep their salaries low and
reduce budget deficits. On the other hand, governments could
be assisted in promoting and protecting human rights where
development finance is designed within the framework
outlined by international human rights law. In-between, many
policies that are apparently human-rights neutral have
significant human rights effects. An example are ceilings on the
size of civil service which may inhibit teacher recruitment and
thus jeopardize increased or even sustained access to education.
These issues are addressed in Primer No. 5; this text is
discussing governmental obligations at the domestic level.
The right to education is routinely classified as an
economic, social and cultural right; these are often deemed to
be lacking remedies and are accordingly treated as quasi-rights
or not-quite rights. As a consequence, denials and violations of
the right to education are not addressed. This reductionism
ruptures the symmetry of law which balances rights and
duties, freedoms and responsibilities. Keeping the symmetry,
this text concentrates on governmental obligations which stem
from the right to education and discusses different types of
human rights obligations which distinct facets of the right to
education entail. Different from its frequent but erroneous
image as being only an economic, social and cultural right, the
right to education is also a civil and political rights. Moreover,
it straddles individual and collective rights, embodying both.
The firm grounding of the right to education in internatio-
nal and domestic human rights law provides for the clarity and
specificity of human rights standards needed for addressing its
key dimensions at the global level. International human rights
law underpins universality of human rights laying down mini-
mal standards to which all people are entitled. Its requirements
are interpreted daily, throughout the world, in the light of the
multitude of different situations that arise. Access of children to
education may be impeded because they cannot comply with
administrative requirements, such as birth or citizenship
certificates, or the nearest school is too far away. There is often
conflict between parental preferences for their children’s
education and the rights of the child, exemplified by the
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widespread bias against educating girls or children with
disabilities. Students’ enrollment may be impeded by the
closure of universities because of political or financial reasons. An
endless variety of real-life issues ceaselessly force domestic courts,
human rights commissions, or international human rights
bodies to clarify the nature and scope of the right to education
through the corresponding governmental obligations.
The right to education is recognized, promoted and
protected at all levels – from local to global – and it fully reflects
the interplay between the dual processes of globalization and
localization which are now taking place. In most federal
countries, education pertains to the remit of regional or local
authorities and the current trend towards decentralization
furthers the localization of education. The parallel process of
globalization substantively affects only the uppermost levels of
the education pyramid. Primary education remains local and
this is unlikely to change. However, the financial impact of
globalization affects the whole education pyramid, while its
ideological underpinning tends to treat education as an
industry,2  which provides a service that should be traded just
like any other, domestically and internationally. The role of the
government in education, affirmed in international and
domestic human rights law, provides a powerful antidote against
the risk of depleting education of remaining a public good and
schooling of remaining a public service. The full mobilization of
the existing human rights standards for education can neutralize
negative dimensions of globalization at all levels, thus enabling
the human rights community to provide a useful and timely
contribution to developments which were, until recently,
deemed to lie beyond the reach of human rights safeguards.
The right to education straddles the division of human
rights into civil and political, on the one hand, and economic,
social and cultural, on the other hand. It embodies them all.
Governmental obligation to respect parental freedom of choice
or free establishment of schools typifies civil and political
contents of the right to education; denials of freedom of and in
education are challenged throughout the world.3
2 Tooley, J. – The Global Education Industry. Lessons from Private
Education in Developing Countries, International Finance Corporation and
Institute of Economic Affairs, Washington D.C. and London, 1999.
3 The human rights guarantees for religion affirm the freedom of religion but not
freedom in religion. The Human Rights Committee has examined the case of a
teacher who ‘had been engaged in a protracted confrontation with the authorities over
his teaching and his employment,’ to determine that his rights were violated by
constant harassment which made his continued teaching impossible. The back-
ground to the case was the denial of his certification by ecclesiastic authorities. A
certificate of suitability, issued by the Catholic Church, is needed for any teacher of
religion and the Church verifies that religious education is provided in accordance
with the precepts of the Catholic Church. The Committee has agreed that the
teacher’s removal from teaching religion was necessitated by his lack of certificate,
which was occasioned by his advocacy of liberation theology. This was beyond the
influence of the Committee or the government of the country concerned. However,
the Committee has added that he could not prevented from continuing in public
service teaching. (Human Rights Committee – William Eduardo Delgado Paez v.
Colombia, Communication No. 195/1985, Views of 12 July 1990.) Differently from
freedom of religion, the human rights guarantees relating to education affirm both
freedom of education (requiring governments to allow non-state schools) and
freedom in education (requiring governments to recognize the rights of parents,
teachers and learners in education, including their rights to question and challenge
school curriculum, textbooks, methods of instruction, rules for school discipline or
their administration and enforcement).
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Governmental obligation to secure school attendance for all
children within the compulsory-age bracket (usually 6–15) has
also been litigated as have controversial school voucher sche-
mes, which strive to reduce governmental obligations to
providing some financial support to parents in their choice of
schooling for their children. This would leave parent-less
children without any choice, children of poor parents with
very little choice, and reinforce selling education according to
the purchasing power of buyers. Governmental obligations
have often been judicially tested regarding education for
children with disabilities, indigenous or minority children, or
children deprived of their liberty, and the courts have affirmed
that governments have to ensure access to education for all
children. Although resource allocation is litigated the least
being widely perceived as an inherently political decision,
intrusions into decisions on allocations of public funding have
been necessitated by the right to education (for example,
governmental obligations to provide transport to school or
textbooks free of charge) and rights in education (for example,
assistance to learners to overcome linguistic obstacles or
learning disabilities).
Moreover, the importance of the right to education
reaches far beyond education itself. Many individual rights are
beyond the grasp of those who have been deprived of
education, especially rights associated with employment and
social security. Education operates as a multiplier, enhancing
the enjoyment of all individual rights and freedoms where the
right to education is effectively guaranteed, while depriving
people of the enjoyment of many rights and freedoms where
the right to education is denied or violated.
This publication has been inspired by the need to
overcome the mixture of confusion and contention which
hampers delineating the right to education as civil, cultural,
economic, political and social right. It summarizes
governmental obligations corresponding to the right to
education in its entirety. While education as a civil and
political right has engendered a great deal of domestic and
international jurisprudence and its contours are fairly well
defined, progress in the vast and heterogeneous category of
economic, social and cultural rights cannot be fast and easy
because this category was itself a cold-war construct.
Consequently, it suffered from distortions which plagued
human rights during the Cold War. The notion of
economic, social and cultural rights required a
reconceptualization after the Cold War had ended, but it
was marginalized instead to escape neglect only at the turn
of the millennium.
Although the Cold War is over, confusion continues as
do attempts to empty economic and social rights of their core
substance. These posit, explicitly or implicitly, that
economic, social and cultural rights are not justiciable which,
were it true, would mean that they are not rights. Such
confusion feeds on two features of international human rights
law:
• Firstly, international human rights law is not directly
applicable in most countries. International human rights
standards are, in most countries, transposed into domestic
law, and then interpreted and applied. It is thus crucially
imports to extract from this rich and diverse material
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those issues for which there is global consensus on what
constitutes a human rights violation, which problems
yield different solutions in interpreting human rights, and
also to infer the optimal solutions for rights-based
education.
• Secondly, many international human rights treaties
dealing with economic, social and cultural rights (with
the exception of those generated within the International
Labour Organization) were written to preclude their
domestic and international litigation. The explicit
wording of international human rights treaties which
were written during the heat of the Cold War,
particularly the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,4  constitutes a considerable
challenge in necessitating a re-interpretation of economic
and social rights adapted to changed circumstances – the
imprecision with which governmental obligations have
been defined, the corresponding inexactness in
definitions of individual rights, the necessity to
dissociate governmental human rights obligations from
general economic, social or cultural policy, and the
systemic nature of problems concerning economic and
social rights which casts doubts on the utility of an
individual complaint mechanism and points to collective
or public interest complaints or else a policy review
mechanism.
These two features are obviously and closely linked: domestic
legal enforcement of a right is the essential prerequisite for its
international enforcement and this text therefore focuses on
domestic jurisprudence.
Abstract provisions of international human rights
treaties or domestic laws tend to be the only guidance
available to educationists and they do not really help to
infer how specific real-life issues should be addressed. Their
interpretation is triggered by the need to apply law to real-
life cases and provides useful guidance in clarifying what
governments should and should not be doing. Even in
countries where education has not been recognized as a
right, balancing parental and children’s rights with regard
to sex education in school, corporal punishment,
governmental regulation of private schools, academic free-
dom for university professors, and many other issues are
being litigated.
Court cases are often initiated by individuals who feel that
their rights have been violated and demand a remedy. The
nature and scope of human rights is then examined through
due process of law, whereby substantive issues are defined or
clarified. Cases represent bottom-up approach – real-life
problems trigger interpretation and application of domestic
and international law. Procedural problems and legal
technicalities deter non-lawyers and are omitted from this
publication. The necessary background will be available at
www.right-to-education.org in a user-friendly form.
4 The comments of states that are party to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights on the Draft Optional Protocol, which is aiming to make
economic, social and cultural rights susceptible to individual complaints for
violations and adjudication by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights can be found in U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/1998/84, E/CN.4/1998/84/Add. 1, E/
CN.4/1999/112, E/CN.4/1999/112/Add.1, and E/CN.4/2000/49.
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– fiscal allocations matching human rights obligations
– schools matching school-aged children (number, diversity)
– teachers (education & training, recruitment, labour rights, trade union
freedoms)
– elimination of legal and administrative barriers
– elimination of financial obstacles
– identification and elimination of discriminatory denials of access
– elimination of obstacles to compulsory schooling (fees, distance,
schedule)
– parental choice of education for their children (with human rights
correctives)
– enforcement of minimal standards (quality, safety, environmental health)
– language of instruction
– freedom from censorship
– recognition of children as subjects of rights
– minority children
– indigenous children
– working children
– children with disabilities
– child migrants, travelers
– concordance of age-determined rights
– elimination of child marriage
– elimination of child labour
– prevention of child soldiering
Box 1:
Conceptual framework
RIGHT TO EDUCATION
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION
RIGHTS THROUGH EDUCATION
AVAILABILITY
ACCESSIBILITY
ACCEPTABILITY
ADAPTABILITY
13Right to Education Primers No. 3
Inter-relatedness of human rights creates overlap between
different components of the right to education but it also
facilitates mapping out the conceptual framework of the right
to education, presented in Box 1. The framework demonstrates
this inter-relatedness of individual components of the right to
education, relates them to the type of governmental human
rights obligations which are their counterparts, and adds
examples of issues that figure prominently in translating the
right to education from requirement into reality.
4-A scheme in a nutshell
A consequence of the symmetry of law is that there could be
no right to education without corresponding obligations for
governments. The basic framework of governmental obligations
is outlined through a series of explicit guarantees of the right
to education in international human rights treaties, national
constitutions, and domestic laws. These obligations can be
easily structured into the 4-A scheme, as sketched in Box 2:
governments have to make education available, accessible,
acceptable and adaptable.
• Availability embodies two different governmental
obligations: the right to education as a civil and political
right requires the government to permit the establishment
of educational institutions by non-state actors, while the
right to education as a social and economic right requires
the government to establish them, or fund them, or use a
combination of these and other means so as to ensure that
education is available.
• Access is defined differently for different levels of
education. The government is obliged to secure access to
education for all children in the compulsory education
age-range, but not for secondary and higher education.
Moreover, compulsory education ought to be free of
charge while post-compulsory education may entail the
payment of tuition and other charges5  and could thus be
subsumed under ‘affordability.’ The increasing trend of
charging fees at post-compulsory education, contrary to
the spirit of international human rights law, will be
addressed in Primer 7, which is devoted to university
education.
• One important facet of the acceptability of education
has been highlighted by the addition of ‘quality’ before
education in policy documents as of the 1990s, thus
urging governments to ensure that education which is
available and accessible is of good quality. The minimal
standards of health and safety, or professional
requirements for teachers, thus have to be set and
enforced by the government. The scope of acceptability
has been considerably broadened through the
development of international human rights law.
Censorship of school textbooks is no different from any
other censorship, except that is it exposed as a human
5 There is difference in the explicit provisions of international human rights treaties,
with the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
requiring the broadening of free-of-charge education upwards to the highest levels
and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child reiterating that primary
education should be free of charge but implicitly endorsing the charging of fees in
secondary and higher education.
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Box 2:
4-A scheme
Establishment/closure of schools
Freedom to establish schools
Funding for public schools
Public funding for private schools
Criteria for recruitment
Fitness for teaching
Labour rights
Trade union freedoms
Professional responsibilities
Academic freedom
All-encompassing
Free-of-charge
Assured attendance
Parental freedom of choice
Discriminatory denials of access
Preferential access
Criteria for admission
Recognition of foreign diplomas
Minimum standards
Respect of diversity
Language of instruction
Orientation and contents
School discipline
Rights of learners
Children with disabilities
Working children
Refugee children
Children deprived of their liberty
AVAILABILITY
ACCESSIBILITY
ACCEPTABILITY
ADAPTABILITY
SCHOOLS
TEACHERS
COMPULSORY
POST-COMPULSORY
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
SPECIAL NEEDS
OUT-OF-SCHOOL EDUCATION
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rights violation infrequently. The focus on indigenous
and minority rights has prioritized the language of
instruction, which often makes education unacceptable
if the language is foreign to young children (and also
often to the teacher). The prohibition of corporal
punishment has transformed school discipline in many
countries further broadening the criteria of acceptabil-
ity. The emergence of children themselves as actors
vindicating their right to education and rights in
education promises to endow the notion of acceptabil-
ity with their vision of how their rights should be
interpreted and applied.
• Adaptability has been best conceptualized through the
many court cases addressing the right to education of
children with disabilities. Domestic courts have uniformly
held that schools ought to adapt to children, following
the thrust of the idea of the best interests of each child in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
reconceptualization has implicitly faulted the heritage of
forcing children to adapt to whatever schools may have
been made available to them; the school effectively had a
right to reject a child who did not fit or could not adapt.
Moreover, a conceptual dissociation between ‘school’ and
‘education’ has taken place in attempts to provide
education to imprisoned or working children. They can
seldom be taken to school and thus education has to be
taken to wherever they are.
The inherent balance between rights and duties, freedoms and
responsibilities orientates law in general and thus also human
rights law. Children cannot have a right to free education
unless the government is able to raise revenue, which means
that companies and individuals have to pay tax. Unless parents
accept that their children have a right to education, education
will not be compulsory. Why law is important becomes clear if
one considers how education can be provided: it can be
delivered by religious institutions, with an implicit (or expli-
cit) purpose of proselytizing; it can be perceived as a gift by a
country’s political leaders or aid donors. Such models do not
make education sustainable (proselytizing is often resisted, a
gift can always be taken away) while beneficiaries are not
treated as subjects of rights but rather as objects of charity, aid
or political patronage.
Legal underpinning of education is routinely absent from
such models. There is no legal right to aid nor a legal obligation
to provide it. As one purpose of law is to ensure security and
predictability, it defines who is entitled to what, who is obliged
to do what, and what happens if the anticipated behaviour does
not ensue so as to correct departures by any actor (including the
government) from the required conduct. Domestic law on
education routinely defines education as compulsory for child-
ren aged 6–15, and lays down the corollary obligation of the
government to make education available and free of charge.
Otherwise, education would be compulsory only in theory.
Children have a duty to attend school because education is
defined as a public good. It is imposed upon children so as to
enable them to become economically self-sustaining, to enable
them to understand the country’s language, past and future, to
create an understanding of the chosen domestic ideology,
religion or political doctrine. It should also teach children about
human rights, but this is seldom translated into practice. Some
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of the practically-implemented purposes of education may
affirm human rights, others may deny them. A review of
education in all its dimensions by the human rights yardstick is
therefore necessary.
International human rights law defines governmental
obligations relating to human rights as whole, specifying
obligations to act and to react, to pursue specific conduct or to
achieve a particular result. One essential role of the
government is to set educational strategy, determine and
enforce educational standards, monitor the implementation of
the strategy and put in place corrective action. This
encompasses both core governmental obligations – to ensure
that education is available and to respect freedom in
education. The former is typically categorized as counterpart of
economic/social/cultural rights, the latter as corollary of civil/
political rights. Table 3 illustrates that no such division can be
made – both types of governmental obligations are laid down
as two sides of the same coin.
Universal Declaration:
Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory.
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to formulate, develop and
apply a national policy which, ... will tend to promote equality of opportunity
and of treatment ... and in particular: (a) To make primary education free and
compulsory.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Primary education shall be compulsory and available free for all.
Convention on the Rights of the Child:
States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to
achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they
shall, in particular:
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free for all.
Table 3:
Universal Declaration:
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education:
The States Parties to this Convention agree that:
(b) It is essential to respect the liberty of parents, ... firstly to choose for their children
institutions other than those maintained by the public authorities but conforming to ... minimum
educational standards, and secondly, to to ensure ... the religious and moral education of the
children in conformity with their own convictions.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents ... to
choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which
conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and
bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, ...
Convention on the Rights of the Child:
No part of [articles 28 and 29] shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals
and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions ...
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Regardless of this feature of international human rights
law, the trend of dissociating inter-related obligations
continues and can be illustrated by typical descriptions of only
one side of the coin:
• human rights may be defined only as safeguards against
abuse of government’s power, which leads to restricting
human rights to protections against torture, summary
executions or disappearances. The corollary is an
erroneous perception that human rights can be secured
without governmental funding because the only
requirement is that governments refrain from abusing
their power. Such a perception is based on silence
about the cost of a well-trained, professional and well-
paid police which is necessary to prevent abuses of
power. The underlying vision of the government as an
enemy leads to demands for a small government, oppo-
sition to taxation or governmental intervention in the
free market, thus clashing against the postulated role of
the government in eradicating poverty, protecting the
rights of the child, or eliminating gender
discrimination.
• the right to education may be defined in terms of access
to free-of-charge schooling at all levels – from the
nursery to post-graduate studies – which increases its
cost beyond the reach of many governments. The
underlying idea is that having a right means that the
government should fund and deliver whatever service is
associated with such a right. It is easily shown as a
misinterpretation taking the right to marry as example –
nobody would argue that having a right to marry means
that the government has to furnish a spouse to whoever
wants one. Rather, having the right to marry entails
corresponding governmental obligations to regulate the
age of marriage (by prohibiting child marriage), to
secure that women have a right to marry (by ensuring
that they are not sold and purchased), that spouses have
equal rights (starting from the outlawing of polygamy),
or that people who marry are not penalized by having
their taxation raised.
1. Availability
Ensuring that primary schools are available for all children
necessitates a considerable investment, which is amplified by
post-compulsory education and universities. While the state
is not the only investor, international human rights law
obliges it to be the investor of last resort so as to ensure that
primary schools are available for all school-age children. In
Africa children of primary-school age constitute close to one-
third of the population and the majority is living in rural
areas. Making primary education available to dispersed rural
communities, some of whom may be nomadic, illustrates the
scope of the challenge. The current global priority for
primary education has focused attention away from secondary
and tertiary education, and thus from governmental
obligations in this area. This issues will be discussed in
Primer No. 7.
Ensuring that education is available revolves rarely, if ever,
only around funding. Freedom of parents and communities to
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establish schools has been part of international human rights
law since its creation. It is guaranteed amongst civil and
political rights and is therefore subject to international as well
as domestic legal enforcement. The European Commission on
Human Rights has affirmed the right to establish private
schools, subject to their regulation and supervision by the
government to ensure that education, especially its quality,
conforms to the prescribed standards.6  Allowing anybody to
set up an institution, call it a ‘school,’ carry out a programme
called ‘education,’ and issue to learners pieces of papers called
‘diplomas’ which may turn out to be worthless is not the
purport of international human rights law; it would constitute
dereliction of governmental human rights obligations. Most
countries thus operate some system of accreditation and/or
licensing so as to ensure that schools are properly equipped
and staffed and that their programmes conform to the defini-
tion of education. The balance which needs to be struck
between the governmental obligation to ensure that education
is worthy of its name and safeguards necessary to prevent the
government from abusing its power to grant or withhold
license has generated endless court cases all over the world.
Court cases are often brought by those who attended
unlicenced educational institutions and are subsequently
precluded from continuing their education because their
diplomas are not recognized, or from taking examinations
needed for employment or further education. In India, one
such case reached the Supreme Court in 1992, after students
from an unrecognized educational institution had secured an
order of a lower court to be allowed to take an exam, granted
them on humanitarian grounds. Out of 129 students, only one
passed, which well illustrated the poor quality of the
unrecognized educational institution which they had
attended. The Court has admonished the lower court,
pointing out that ‘slackening the standard and judicial fiat to
control the mode of education and examining systems are
detrimental to the efficient management of education.’ The
need to ensure that nominally available schools conform to the
established educational standards has been thus described:
This Court judicially noted mushroom growth of ill-
equipped and under-staffed unrecognized educational
institutions in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Tamil Nadu
and Maharashtra States and other States too are no
exceptions. Obviously the field of education is found
to be fertile, perennial and profitable business venture
with least capital outlay. This case is one such case
from the State of Maharashtra.
It would appear that individuals or societies,
without complying with the statutory requirements,
establish educational or training institutions ill
equipped to impart education and have students
admitted, in some instances despite warnings by the
State Government and in some instances without
knowledge of the State Government concerned, but
with connivance at lower levels.
6 European Commission on Human Rights – Ingrid Jordebo Foundation of Christian
Schools and Ingrid Jordebo v. Sweden, Application No. 11533, Decision of 6 March
1987, Decisions & Reports, vol. 51, p. 125.
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The ill-equipped and ill-housed institutions and sub-
standard staff therein are counter-productive and
detrimental to inculcating spirit of inquiry and
excellence in the students. The disregard of statutory
compliance would amount to letting loose of innocent
and unwary children.7
The other facet of the obligation to ensure that schooling is
available are safeguards against abuses of power by the
government. A government may close a university because
professors and students have challenged the official
orthodoxy exercising their freedom of expression. Or it may
disregard the right to education and breach its obligation to
ensure that education is available. The African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights found in 1996 that a two
year long closure of universities and secondary schools in
Zaire (as it was at the time) constituted a violation of
Article 17 of the Charter, which guarantees the right to
education.8
Legal challenges of un-available education follow the
rule of inverse proportion: where education is the least
available, its absence is attributed to poverty and there are
no legal challenges. The most important reason is that no
legal obligation can force the state to make education
available if this is beyond its powers; nobody can be legally
obliged to do the impossible. English courts have held that
this obligation requires the local authorities to do whatever
they reasonably can to ensure that education is available. In
one particular case, the duty of the local education
authority to secure sufficient school places for all children
within the compulsory school age was not fully
implemented and 300 children were deprived of primary
education because of a shortage of teachers. The court held
that the authority did whatever was in its powers to rectify
the situation and was thus not in breach of its statutory
duty.9
1.1 Funding for public and private schools
Securing that education is available reveals a variety of
models: the government can fund diverse schools but not
operate any, or operate a network of state and/or public
schools without funding any non-state schools. The
extremes of a state’s monopoly over education or its
complete dissociation from education, neither of which
would be consistent with international human rights law,
7 Supreme Court of India – State of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale and
Others, judgment of 11 August 1992, paras. 2–3 and 12, (1992) 4 Supreme Court
Cases 435.
8 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – Free Legal Assistance
Group, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v. Zaire, Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and
100/93 (joined), Decision of the Commission adopted at its 18th ordinary session at
Prais (Cape Verde), Ninth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1995/96, Assembly of Heads of State and Government,
Thirty-second Ordinary Session, 7–10 July 1996, Yaounde, Cameroon.
9 R. v. Inner London Education Authority, ex parte Ali, [1990] C.O.D. 317, [1990] 2
Admin.L.R. 822, 828B.
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are rare. Some countries have only public schools, others
only private, while most have a mixture. The meaning of
‘private’ varies a great deal. In its broadest sense, it
encompasses all non-state-run schools, some of which may
actually be partially or even fully funded by the state.
Governmental obligation to make education available is in
practice frequently, albeit erroneously, associated with its
provision of education. In quite a few countries,
governments provide subsidies to diverse range of schools
without operating any.
The assumption behind the term ‘private’ is that all such
schools are profit-making while many are not. The term is
applied to formal and non-formal education, religious and
secular schools, minority and indigenous schools, as well as
schools for children with special needs. Some private schools
are supplementing state-run schools and are established
where they do not provide education in a particular minority
language or religion, or do not accommodate children with
physical or learning disabilities. Others are established as an
alternative to state-provided education. The practice of states
varies with regard to subsidies for non-public schools.
Indeed, there is a great deal of difference in the very
classification of schools as public and/or state schools and
private schools. The classification developed by UNESCO,
which is globally used in education statistics, divides schools
by the criterion of their management, by the state or private,
and ‘government-aided schools are considered private if they
are privately managed.’10  Differently, English courts have
classified schools into state (i.e. public) and private by the
criterion of the source of funding. If a school’s funding comes
out of public revenue, it is defined as a state school regardless
of how it is managed.11
Resource allocation is generally seen as a political decision
and un-elected courts neither can nor should usurp the
prerogatives of elected parliamentarians. Human rights
correctives lie at the boundary between political and legal
processes. Education is commonly financed out of general
taxation, which in some countries places the mobilization of
funding for education beyond the remit of domestic courts. A
typical example is the United States, where economic and
social rights are not recognized and, furthermore, the Supreme
Court has declared taxation as well as economic and social
policy to lie beyond its purview. It has held that raising and
disbursing tax constitutes a legislative function beyond the
remit of courts. The case dealt with the financing of education
at the district level out of property tax, which had created a
great deal of difference between rich and poor districts. The
Court has refrained from questioning this system, although
funding depended ‘on the relative wealth of the political
subdivisions in which citizens live.’ Rather, it favoured the
‘freedom to devote more money to the education of one’s
children,’ preferring local autonomy over increased powers for
the central government:‘other systems of financing, which
place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
10 UNESCO – 1998 World Education Report, Paris, 1999, p. 118.
11 National Union of Teachers v. Governing Body of St.Mary’s Church of England Aided
School, [1995] ICR 317, EAT [1997] IRLR 242 (CA); R. v. Haberdashers’ Aske’s
Hatcham Trust, ex parte T [1995] ELR 350; EA 1996, ss 482 (1) (b), (3); 483.
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State, [would] result in comparable lessening of desired local
autonomy.’12
Nevertheless, challenges of the allocation of public funds
to private schools in other countries have introduced human
rights correctives in resource allocation. Such cases have often
been a response to the recent trends of privatization and
commoditization of education, especially to school vouchers.
School vouchers have altered the established practice of the
states to finance a network of public schools so that all children
have access, and the consequent allocation of children to a
particular school by some objective criteria, such as distance.
School vouchers introduced a different view of the obligations of
the state – rather than having to ensure that public schools are
available for all children and that all schools comply with the
requirements of quality and safety, the introduction of school
vouchers has enabled parents to shop around with the voucher in
hand as payment. Through such voucher schemes, governments
have enabled parents to choose a school for their children, with
the state’s contribution to the child’s education embodied in the
voucher, usually amounting to the enrolment and/or tuition fee.
The rationale has been that individual schools should be rewarded
for attracting learners, while those unable to do so should be
deprived of funding. At a higher level of abstraction, the rationale
is to enhance competitiveness and/or broaden parental freedom of
choice. An additional, albeit implicit reason, has been a wish to
subject public schools to competition, seeing them as having
monopolized education. This approach has generated a great deal
of controversy by challenging the premise accepted in many
countries, namely that the government is obliged either to provide
all-encompassing public education (at least within the
compulsory school age) or to subsidize a variety of non-public
schools, in both cases ensuring that all schools comply with the
basic quality standards.
Through voucher schemes, governments enable individual
learners to make payments to the school of their choice. The
distinction between public and private, state and non-state,
fee-charging and free schools – and the diversity which they
embody – is likely to be eroded if the introduction of vouchers
gains ground. Only schools able to attract learners and/or
funding will be left. The rationale behind vouchers sees
governments as providing some funding to learners to the
detriment of the full range of governmental human rights
obligations, namely to ensure that schooling is available,
accessible, acceptable and adaptable.
On-going debates about school vouchers started within the
realm of economics, focusing on consumer choice and
competitiveness while rejecting the notion of education as a
public good.13  Court cases have brought the issue into the
realm of the rule of law. The voucher scheme introduced in 1993
in Puerto Rico was declared unconstitutional in the part which
accorded to selected pupils a financial grant of $1,500 for
12 US Supreme Court – San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 21
March 1973.
13 Education constitutes a public good because its worth increases when it is shared
and it cannot be prevented from spreading – people learn regardless of whether they
are meant to or not, children and adults alike. Different from education, schooling
cannot easily be defined as a public good because individuals can be prevented from
access to school. Deprivation of schooling cannot be equalized with a lack of education
– people learn at home, on the street, in the community, in prison or refugee camp.
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transfer from public to private school.14  The constitutional
prohibition of diverting public funds to private schools, origina-
ting from the separation between the church and the state, has
been upheld. Although the voucher scheme did not revolve
around secular or religious schools, because private included
religious schools, this constitutional ban precluded the spread of
voucher schemes. They were also aimed at financially stimula-
ting transfer from public to private schools (thus also transfer-
ring tax revenue to private schools) with the aim of increasing
choice, against the constitutional requirement for public funds
to be used solely for public schools.
Controversies relating to vouchers routinely revolve around
economic arguments, however, thus departing from the
meaning and purpose of the right to education. Within the
existing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Colombia has
ably clarified why education should not be guided by
economic arguments alone:
[A]though the Constitution protects economic
activities, private initiative and competition, as well as
recognizing the right of private entities to establish
schools, these liberties cannot negate nor can they
diminish the nature of education as public service and
its social function; education is also and above all else
a fundamental right…
[E]ducation – even if it is private – has to be provided
in the conditions which guarantee equality of
opportunity in access to education; all forms of
discrimination and ‘elitism’ are thus repugnant to its
nature of public service with profound social contents;
these, by virtue of excessive economic demands,
automatically deny access to intellectually able
persons solely because [of ] their levels of income.15
All aspects of public funding for private schools have been
litigated vigorously, domestically and internationally, so as to
define individual rights and the corresponding governmental
obligations. Much international jurisprudence has originated
from demands upon states to finance alternatives to uniform
public schooling. The jurisprudence focusing on public
funding to facilitate the exercise of freedom to establish and
operate schools guaranteed under international human rights
law has overcome a boundary between civil and political
rights, which are often perceived as being costless, and
economic, social and cultural rights, viewed as costly.
15 In the original, the Court has said:’si bien la Constitución protege la actividad
económica, la iniciative privada y la libre competencia y reconoce también el derecho
de los particulares de fundar centros educativos, tales libertades no pueden anular ni
disminuir el carácter de servicio público y de funcón social [atribuido por la
Constitución Política a la educación,] que también y sobre todod es un derecho
fundamental... [L]a educación – aun la privada – debe prestarse en condiciones tales
que garantice la igualdad de oportunidades en el acceso a ella, por lo cual repugna a
su sentido de servicio público conprofundo contenido social cualquier forma de trato
discriminario o ‘elitista’ que, en virtud de un exagerado requerimiento económico,
excluya per se a personas intelectualmente capaces [por el] suyo nivel de ingresos.’
Supreme Court of Colombia – Request to determine that Article 203 (in part) of the
Law No. 115 of 1994 is unconstitutional by Andres De Zubiria Samper, Judgment of
6 November 1997, C-560/97.
14 Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico – Asociación de Maestros v. José Arsenio Torres,
30 de noviembre de 1994, 94 DTS 12:34.
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The Human Rights Committee has held that a
government ‘cannot be deemed to act in a discriminatory
fashion if it does not provide the same level of subsidy for the
two [public and private] types of establishment, when the
private system is not subject to State supervision.’ In a similar
case, which dealt with the provision of free textbooks and
school meals to children in public but not in private schools,
the Committee has affirmed its previous view, adding that ‘the
preferential treatment given to public sector schooling is
reasonable and based on objective criteria.’16  This affirmation
of the priority for public over private schools goes beyond
funding: the role of education in the socialization of children
prioritizes inclusiveness over segregation. In the well-known
words of the US Supreme Court, ‘separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.’17
The European Commission on Human Rights has during
its previous existence affirmed that the state has no obligation
to subsidize private schools while it has the right to subject
such schools to regulation and supervision because it is
responsible for ensuring that all education complies with the
prescribed standards.18  Domestic courts have been dealing
with this subject-matter in different countries and have
followed the thrust of international human rights law. The
Supreme Court of Canada, having examined a complaint
against a denial of public funding to private religious schools,
has affirmed that the purpose of public schools is provision of
education for all members of the community. The exercise of
the parental freedom to educate their children in accordance
with their religious beliefs in separate schools (or at home)
prevents their children from taking advantage of public schools
and creates costs for the parents; such exercise of parental
freedom does not entail an entitlement to public funding,
however.19
1.2 Teachers
There is a myriad of human rights issues which particularly
affect teachers but these attract little attention in the literature
on the right to education, which is focused on children. If the
rights of teachers are not respected and protected, it is
impossible to imagine that this may be different for the rights of
children.
To begin with, teachers have to be educated and trained to
teach, and there has been no hesitation on the part of courts to
16 Human Rights Committee – Carl Henrik Blom v. Sweden, Communication No.
191/1985, Views adopted on 4 April 1988, Selected Decisions of the Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol, Seventeenth to thirty-second sessions (October
1982 – April 1988), United Nations, New York, 1990, p. 219, para. 10.3; G. and L.
Lindgren and L. Holm et. al. v. Sweden, Communications Nos. 298/1988 and 299/
1988, Views of the Committee adopted on 9 November 1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
40/D/298-299/1988 of 7 December 1990, para. 10.3.
17 Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., Judgment of 17 May 1954, 347
U.S. 294.
18 Eur opean Commission on Human Rights – Decisions concerning applications
Nos. 6857/74 and 11533/85, Decisions and Reports, vol. 9, p. 27 and vol. 51, p. 125.
19 Supreme Court of Canada – Adler v. Ontario, Judgment of 21 November 1996,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, (1996) 140 DLR (4th) 385.
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affirm that teachers ought to be qualified to teach, including
perfect command of the language in which they are expected to
teach.20  This court case illustrates the abyss between vast parts
of the world where most teachers are untrained, and small parts
where teachers’ qualifications are strictly controlled. South
Africa’s Constitutional Court has addressed one frequent remedy
for the lack of teachers, the resort to ‘contract teachers.’
Disfavouring this remedy, it has also faulted a requirement for
teachers to be citizens. The Court has found that ‘non-citizens
are a minority in all countries and have little political muscle,’
rejected the government’s justification for denying teaching
posts to non-citizens so as to provide employment to its own
citizens, and gave the highest priority to the provision of quality
education.21
The teachers’ status as civil and/or public servants, which
is particularly widespread for primary school teachers, often
leads to the denial of their trade union freedoms as well as
collective bargaining, while a definition of teaching as an
essential service leads to the denial of the teachers’ right to
strike. Trade union freedoms and labour rights for teachers,
much as for other professions, form part of basic international
labour standards, which are legally enforceable in many
countries as well as internationally. Denials of the right to
form trade unions, dismissals of striking teachers (or their
punishment by internal exile, transfers, or reduced salaries),
anti-union discrimination, harassment, arrests or murders of
trade union leaders, have affected teachers in many countries.
ILO Freedom of Association Committee has consistently
rejected assertions that teaching is an essential service and has
affirmed that teachers have the right to strike, stating that
‘the right to strike can only be restricted and even prohibited
in the public service (public employees being those who act
as agents of the public authority) or in the essential services
in the strict sense of the term (i.e. those services whose
interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or
health of the whole or part of the population).22  The
Committee has reaffirmed the teachers’ right to strike: ‘the
right to strike [is] one of the fundamental rights of workers
and their organizations; it is one of the essential means
through which they may promote and defend their
occupational interests.’23  Moreover, the ILO has affirmed
that besides safeguarding their occupational interests, trade
unions ‘should be able to have recourse to protest strikes, in
particular aimed at criticising a government’s economic and
social policies.’24
A complaint by two university teachers, who had been
arrested for the offence of lèse-majesté (‘outrage au Chef de
20 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission of Australia – Maria D’Souza
v. Peter Geyer and Directorate of School Education, No. H94/100, 1995–1996, and T. v
Department of Education of the State of Victoria, No. H96/149, 1 July 1997.
21 Constitutional Court of South Africa – Larbi-Odam v. The Member of the Executive
Council for Education (North-West Province), SA 745 (CC), 1998.
22 Freedom of Association Committee – 272nd Report, Case No. 1503 (Peru), para. 117.
23 Freedom of Association Committee – 277th Report, Case No. 1528 (Germany), para. 285. 
24 Freedom of Association Committee – 304th Report, Case No. 1863 (Guinea), para. 358.
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l’Etat dans l’exercise de sa fonction’) and subsequently
refused reinstatement in their jobs upon release from
prison, with the justification that they had deserted their
posts, was examined by the Human Rights Committee. The
Committee has affirmed that ‘the freedom to engage in
political activity individually or through political parties,
freedom to debate public affairs, to criticise the
Government and to publish material with political content’
applies to university teachers, whether they are part of the
public service or not.25
The teaching profession is affected by various types of
gender imbalance. Among primary-school teachers, female
teachers are a small proportion in some countries while a vast
majority in others, as illustrated in Table 4. These two
extremes highlight the necessity of adaptability: many inter-
national and domestic policies have been developed to
increase the number of female teachers, but few to address
the other extreme. There are few countries in the world that
have established a policy of gender balance, namely the
objective that the representation of one sex should not exceed
40% without corrective measures being triggered off. Table 4
shows that women constitute more than two-thirds or even
more than four-fifths of primary school teachers in some
countries. The risk of perpetuating their marginalization
rather than promoting equality was noted forty years, in the
very first report on discrimination in education within the
United Nations. The Report summarized reasons for women
forming the majority of teachers in primary school as ‘the
idea than women are particularly well suited to teach young
children, the fact that teaching offers an outlet to women to
whom many other careers remain closed, and the fact that
men are attracted towards better paid professions.’26
25 Human Rights Committee – Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S.
Dobou v. Togo, Communications No. 422/1990, 423/1990, and 424/1990, Views of 12
July 1996.
26 United Nations – Study of Discrimination in Education by Charles Ammoun,
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/181/Rev. 1, Sales No. 1957.XIV.3,
New York, August 1957, p. 43.
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Above 90% Armenia, Bahamas, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Ukraine
Between 75% and 90% Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Botswana,
Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Dominica,
Estonia, France, Germany, Guyana, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan,
Lesotho, Malta, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Qatar, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles, Sri
Lanka, Suriname, St Kitts and Nevis, St
Lucia, Swaziland, United Kingdom, Uzbeki-
stan, Venezuela, USA, Yugoslavia
Between 50 and 75% Albania, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile,
Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, FYROM, Greece,
Grenada, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Myanmar, Namibia,
Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Spain, St Vincent and
Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
United Arab Emirates
Table 4:
Gender imbalance amongst teachers
Between 25 and 50% Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, China, Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, India, Kenya, Laos, Malawi,
Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Below 25% Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal,
Pakistan, Senegal, Togo
Source: UNESCO – World Education Report 1998, pp. 144–147; the figures refer to
1995.
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2. Accessibility: Focus on girls
Access to public schools should be guided by non-
discrimination, the overriding principle of international human
rights law, which applies to civil and political, and economic,
social and cultural rights, as well as to the rights of the child.
Non-discrimination is not subject to progressive realization but
has to be secured immediately and fully. Respect of parental
freedom of choice for the education of their children is also not
subject to progressive realization but should be guaranteed fully
and immediately. Its exercise, however, sometimes clashes
against the elimination of discrimination for the rights of the
child, such as deprivation of education for girls.
Primer No. 6 is devoted to discrimination, including in access
to education, hence this one is confined to brief outline of access to
education for girls. Indeed, the existing quantitative and qualitative
information on the lack of access to education has thus far been
systematically collected only for girls and women. The right to
education has been demonstrated to act as a corrective to the free
market. Governments indeed have human rights obligations because
primary education should not be treated as a commodity. There has
been a growing acceptance of the necessity for governmental
intervention concerning access to primary education for girls. Many
economists refer to the rationale for such intervention as a market
failure. In its simplest version, it can be described as the
unwillingness of parents to send their daughters to school because
there is no economic rationale to invest in their daughters’
education. A demand for girls’ education thus has to be created by
providing incentives to parents. Such initiatives showed that
conflicting expectations upon girls may deprive them of access to
education. If they are required to perform household labour, the
school schedule has to be adapted to the seasonal and daily rhythm
of subsistence food production or family life. Since poor families
depend on the work of each member of the family for their survival,
combining school and work often proves necessary so as to make
school really accessible for girls.
An interplay between non-availability of schools and
parental choices often impedes girls’ access to education. There
is a great deal of research targeting parental choices, but a
paucity of information about the availability of schools for
girls. Available schools may be open only to boys – by law or
in fact – while the existing educational statistics do not make
this difference visible. It is impossible to determine whether
the available schools have a sufficient intake capacity to enrol
and retain all primary age school girls or not. Table 5 shows
that gender imbalance prejudices girls, although there are
countries in which the girls outnumber the boys. Primary
schools in the Caribbean or Eastern Europe have difficulties in
attracting and retaining boys, one reason being that the vast
majority of teachers are female.
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More than + 10% Lesotho (11%), Trinidad and Tobago (11%)
+ 3% to + 9% Mongolia (3%), Nicaragua (3%), Bahamas
(4%), Dominican Republic (4%), Botswana
(5%), Namibia (7%),
+ 1% to + 2% Albania, Bahrain, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Korea, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Panama, South Africa, USA,
Yugoslavia
– 1% to – 2% Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia,
FYROM, Guyana, Libya, Madagascar, Malta,
Oman, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Samoa,
Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Tanzania, United Arab
Emirates, Zambia
– 3% to – 5% Belarus, Eritrea, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Tunisia, Turkey, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Somalia,
– 6% to – 9% Congo/Brazaville (6%), Uganda (7%), Algeria
(8%), Bangladesh (8%), Bolivia (8%), Burundi
(8%), Syria (8%), Ethiopia (9%), Djibouti
(9%), Iraq (9%), Mauritania (9%),
Table 5: Gender imbalance amongst pupils
– 10% to – 20% Cameroon (10%), Comoros (10%), Mozambi-
que (10%), Mali (11%), Papua New Guinea
(12%), Senegal (12%), Burkina Faso (13%),
Egypt (13%), Iran (13%), Laos (14%), Niger
(14%), Gambia (18%), Guinea (18%), Morocco
(19%)
More than – 20% Congo/Kinshasa (21%), Central African
Republic (22%), Guinea-Bissau (26%), Togo
(26%), Afghanistan (27%),Chad (29%), Benin
(31%), Nepal (39%),
In the following countries there is no difference between net primary school
enrolment for boys and girls: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium,
Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malawi,
Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
Uruguay.
Source: UNICEF – The State of the World’s Children 1999, pp. 106–109.
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3. Acceptability
Extreme views of the role of the government in education are
embodied in seeing the state as the sole funder and provider of
education, with the other extreme deeming the state to be only
the regulator. Much as in any other area, the extremes are rarely
present in the practice of states and cloak the global consensus
around the regulatory role of the state, that is, its task to set and
enforce educational standards and provide the necessary
funding. The right to education ‘by its very nature calls for
regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and
place according to the needs and resources of the community
and of individuals.’27  The state is obliged to ensure that all
schools conform to the minimal criteria which it has developed,
thus ensuring one component of making education acceptable.
Respect for parental freedom to have their children
educated in conformity with their religious, moral or
philosophical convictions has been affirmed in all general human
rights treaties and is continuously subjected to litigation. The
Supreme Court of Canada has rejected a claim by a parent to
‘educate his children as he pleases,’ based on ‘his authority over
his children and his duty to attend to their education’ which
comes from God. Although Canadian law does not require
compulsory education but allows parents to exempt their
children from attending school if they are ‘under efficient
instruction at home or elsewhere,’ the applicant had refused to
apply for an approval of home education, claiming that this
would violate his religious freedom. The Court has found that
‘accommodation of defendant’s religious beliefs would entail a
complete exemption from state regulation’ and thus ‘severely
impede the achievement of important state goals.’28
Respect of religious convictions in education has emerged
with particular frequency with regard to Jehovah’s Witnesses.
The European Court of Human Rights examined a complaint
concerning a girl who was suspended from school because of
her refusal to participate in a parade. She regarded it as a
commemoration of war, and her religious convictions
prevented her from participating in an event that would glorify
warfare. The Court took note of the parents’ pacifist
convictions (not saying much about the girl’s) but found no
human rights violation.29  The Supreme Court of the
Philippines has taken the opposite approach and affirmed that
children who are Jehovah’s Witnesses have the right to be
exempt from the flag ceremony (consisting of the singing of
the national anthem, saluting the flag and reciting a patriotic
pledge) because their freedom to exercise their religious beliefs
could only be limited on the grounds of a danger to public
safety.30
The language of instruction is a frequent bone of
contention because it can preclude children from attending
28 Supreme Court of Canada – R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R, 284.
29 European Court of Human Rights – Efstratiou v. Greece and Valsamis v. Greece,
Judgments of 18 December 1996.
30 Supreme Court of the Philippines – Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of
School of Cebu, G.R. Nos. 95770 & 95887, 1 March 1993 and 29 December 1995.
27 European Court of Human Rights – Belgian Linguistic Case, Judgment of 23 July
1968, Series A, No. 6, para. 5.
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school or learning, if they are at school. It has always created a
great deal of controversy in education and this is not likely to
diminish, on the contrary. Controversies span decision-making
on the official language(s) of instruction for public schools, the
teaching of as well as teaching in minority and indigenous
languages (as well as the recognition thereof ), and the teaching
of (as well as in) foreign languages.
The European Court of Human Rights has affirmed the
right of the state to determine official languages of the country
which are thus the languages of instruction in public schools,
but denied that there was such a thing as a right to education
in a language of one’s choice.31
Governments have been required to respect the right of
minorities to set up their own schools in minority languages since
the time of the League of Nations. In 1919, the precedent was set
by Poland. Alongside education in minority languages in public
schools, it affirmed the right of citizens who were members of
minorities to establish, manage and control schools at their own
expense ‘with the right to use their own language and to exercise
their religion freely therein.’32  That right was subsequently
confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice.33
More than half a century later, dilemmas regarding the language
of instruction have increased rather than diminishing. Demands
that minority schools be made ‘free’ (that is, state-financed) are
often made but seldom granted. The right to be educated in one’s
mother tongue has been on the international human rights
agenda since the 1950s and controversies intensified in the 1990s,
when the wisdom of unilingual education, even in one’s mother
tongue, has been challenged, adding a new item to this endless
controversy. The financial implications of multiligualism in
primary school have further exacerbated controversies.
From the rights of the child perspective, the obligation to
make primary school acceptable goes far beyond parental
freedom of choice or the language of instruction, and poses a
great deal of challenge for all states. Restrictions upon school
discipline are a good example because they have considerably
increased in the past decade to protect the child’s dignity
against humiliation or degradation. They were, and are likely
to remain, subject to litigation.
An attempt by parents whose religious doctrine deemed
physical punishment of children to be legitimate and necessary
to challenge Sweden’s 1979 policy against corporal punishment
of children forced the European Commission on Human
Rights to revisit the issue that had already been the object of
considerable litigation. The parents complained against the
encroachment upon their rights, but did not persuade the
Commission to rule against Sweden.34  A similar case was
litigated in South Africa two decades later, with a similar
31 European Court of Human Rights – The Belgian Linguistic Case, Judgment of 23
July 1968, Series A, vol. 6, p.31.
32 Article 8 of the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919, reproduced in Protection of
Linguistic and Racial Minorities by the League of Nations, Geneva, 1927.
33 Permanent Court of International Justice – Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory
Opinion of 6 April 1935, Series A/B, No. 64.
34 European Commission on Human Rights – Seven individuals v. Sweden,
Application No. 8811/79, decision of 13 May 1982 on the admissibility of the
application, Decisions and Reports, vol. 29, p. 111–112.
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result. It is excerpted in Box 6 below, in the section which
deals with the role of education in preventing violence.
4. Adaptability
What children should learn at school and how the learning
process should be organized is the source of never-ending
challenge and change. The usual approach is to review the
contents and process of learning from the viewpoint of the
child as future adult, while the Convention on the Rights of
the Child requires that the best interests of the child be given
priority. The choice in the Convention to refer to the best
interests of the individual child highlights the need for the
educational system to become and remain adaptable. The
challenge is immense – the system of education is required to
adapt to each individual child, against the historical heritage of
excluding all the children who were deemed not to be able to
adapt to the system of education as it was.
The way in which children perceive their own community
and the world at large is influenced by the presence and
absence of particular people and phenomena within the system
of education. Children with disabilities are often segregated
into separate schools or denied education altogether, and also
absent from school books. Differently, the head of state and/or
government tends to be very much present in schools – each
classroom may have his photograph and textbooks may devote
considerable attention to his professional or private life.
Neighbouring countries may be portrayed in a positive or
negative life. Amongst the children themselves, many may be
excluded from formal schooling. Domestic servants, which are
prevalent throughout Africa and in much of Asia, are likely not
be deemed school-worthy and school-going children will not
perceive them as school-children but as servants. Moreover, an
unusual term has been forged to differentiate between children
by classifying some as ‘educable,’ excluding others. The
criterion is fluid – children who may be classified as ‘non-
educable’ may simply not understand the language in which
they are addressed. Children with learning difficulties may be
classified as ‘un-educable’ and prevented from learning rather
than being helped to learn.
The historical heritage of education has encompassed
many different criteria and methods of exclusion. As mentio-
ned above in the section on access to education, some of this
exclusion has followed stereotyped features attributed to
people who are female, or non-white, or foreigners, or
indigenous. Another track, not much different substantively,
has followed a division of humanity into able and disabled,
excluding those classified as disabled from education.
4.1 Children with disabilities
Conceptually the most far-reaching judicial interpretations of
the meaning of the right to education have dealt with children
with disabilities. It is indeed the best illustration of the
strength and vigour of the notion of the rights of the child to
see courts in a variety of countries affirming that education has
to be adapted to each child rather than forcing children to
adapt to whatever schooling has been designed for them.
The requirement upon schools to adapt to learners with
special needs has been subjected to a great deal of litigation. The
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objective of inclusiveness, that is, integration of learners with
disabilities in mainstream schools has imposed upon schools and
teachers the need to adapt to learners with divergent abilities
and needs. The Supreme Court of Canada has thus defined non-
discrimination with regard to persons with disabilities:
Exclusion from the mainstream of society results
from the construction of a society based solely on
‘mainstream’ attributes to which disabled persons
with never be able to gain access. Whether it is the
impossibility of success at a written test for a blind
person, or the need for a ramp access to a library, the
discrimination does not lie in the attribution of
untrue characteristics to the disabled individual. The
blind person cannot see and the person in a
wheelchair needs a ramp. Rather, it is the failure to
make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune
society so that its structures and assumptions do not
result in the relegation and banishment of disabled
persons from participation, which results in
discrimination against them. The discrimination
inquiry which uses ‘the attribution of stereotypical
characteristics’ reasoning as commonly understood is
simply inappropriate here. It may be seen rather as a
case of reverse stereotyping which, by not allowing
for the condition of a disabled individual, ignores
his or her disability and forces the individual to sink
or swim within the mainstream environment. It is
recognition of the actual characteristics, and
reasonable accommodation of these characteristics
which is the central purpose of [non-
discrimination].35
The principle of non-discrimination has been interpreted to
necessitate a comparison between learners with and without
disabilities in order to detect and inhibit less favourable treatment
of learners with disabilities. A distinction between meeting their
special needs and a positive obligation to treat them more
favourably has been analyzed by the Federal Court of Australia. The
Court has found that accommodation of special needs sometimes
requires positive action to be taken, but has not accepted the
reasoning of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion, whose decision it has faulted. The Commission claimed that
the yardstick should be the effort made by the school, or the lack
thereof, to meet the needs of a specific learner. The Commission
laid down as the yardstick ‘what the school ideally ought to have
done.’ The Federal Court has adopted a lower criterion, explaining
that non-discrimination required a comparison between the
treatment of the learner with disabilities with that of a learner
without disabilities in the same circumstances,36  and thus laying
down a relative rather than an absolute yardstick.
The European Commission on Human Rights has held that
the right to education ‘does not require the admission of a severely
handicapped child to an ordinary school, with the expense of
35 Supreme Court of Canada – Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1
S.C.R., 241, para. 67.
36 Federal Court of Australia – A school v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity
Commission & Anor [1998] 1437 FCA, 11 November 1998.
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additional teaching staff or to the detriment of other pupils’ when
education can be provided in a special school.37  This has been
amplified by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which has
held that inclusiveness, the general approach favouring the
education of disabled and non-disabled children together in
general public schools, does not diminish the need to review the
circumstances of each individual case, giving particular weight to
the views of the child and his or her parents. The Court has added
the need to consider the requirements, including financial, of a
specific solution for the educational authorities:
The current state of pedagogical research does not
indicate that a general exclusion of disabled children
from integrated general schools can be constitutionally
justified. The education should be integrated, provi-
ding special support for disabled pupils if required, so
far as the organizational, personal and practical
circumstances allow this. This reservation is included as
an expression of the need for the State to consider all
the needs of the community in carrying out its duties,
including the financial and organizational factors.38
Different from the general trend towards a preference for inclusive
education, the US Supreme Court has held that disabled children
should be provided with education which enables them to benefit
educationally and meets general educational standards, not
specifying how this should be accomplished. The Court has said,
however, that for children with disabilities within compulsory
school age education should be free.39  Similarly, Dutch courts
have held that the state’s reduction of funding for education of
children with special needs, in the form of halting the growth of
the number of teachers regardless of increasing numbers of
students, constituted a human rights violation.40  These
affirmations of the governmental obligation to ensure that funding
is available represent a valuable example of the need to apply
human rights correctives to resource allocation.
4.2 Working children
Adaptability of education has been vividly depicted in the altera-
tion between getting children into school and getting education
to where the children are. For children who are deprived of their
liberty, education ought to be provided where they are and this is
unlikely to happen unless children have the right to education.
Similarly, many working children cannot attend school and so
education has to be provided where they are.
The International Labour Organization laid down the link
between the age for completion of compulsory education and the
minimum age for employment in 1921, when ILO Convention
37 European Commission on Human Rights – Martin Klerks v. the Netherlands,
Application No. 25212/94, Decision on admissibility of 4 July 1995, Decisions &
Reports, vol. 82, 1994, p. 129.
38 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany – Decision of 8 October 1997, 1 BvR 9/97.
39 US Supreme Court – Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 28 June 1982.
40 Raad van State – Kemper v. City of Leiden, Judgment of 10 May 1989; Tribunal of
‘s Gravenhage – City of Leiden v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 26 July 1989.
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No. 10 prohibited employment which prejudices children’s school
attendance and set the age at 14. This link has almost fallen into
oblivion and the recent global mobilization for the elimination of
child labour has channelled attention to working children. The
ILO-IPEC (International Programme for the Elimination of Chid
Labour) has been set up to facilitate ‘a process geared to reform
and change in social attitudes and in public and corporate policies
that will lead to sustainable prevention and abolition of child
labour from within a country.’41
Both prevention and abolition of child labour have imposed
additional challenges upon education. Prevention of child labour
necessitates a conceptual shift in the orientation of education
towards the acknowledgment of one simple fact:’the unavoidable
labour reality is very much local.’42  Any and every global or
foreign model then has to be adapted to that local reality. The
dominant trend in the conceptualization of human rights in the
Western industrialized countries, which influenced international
human rights law, defined work as access to employment in the
formal sector. Self-employment in the informal sector (whether
subsistence and entrepreneurship) emerged later and does not
have, as yet, any clear-cut international human rights standards.
The heritage of designing primary education so as to lead pupils
to secondary and higher education does not make the situation
better, on the contrary. Adaptability of education to self-
employment in the informal sector is often hampered by school
curricula ‘developed centrally by groups of ‘experts’ who design
them to prepare children for the next level of education to which
many children will be unable to proceed.’43  The attractiveness of
such education for pupils and their parents suffers in consequence.
Creating opportunities for working children to ‘learn and
earn’44  have been grounded in the necessity for poor people –
including children – to work so as to be able to survive. Full-time
education then appears to be a luxury rather than a basic right of
the child, and changing that cruel reality requires a great deal of
political and financial commitment. The Supreme Court of India
has accepted this ‘learn and earn’ approach for non-hazardous
employment of children below 14 years of age, mandating a
reduction of daily working hours to six, coupled with at least two
hours of education at the expense of the employer. For hazardous
work, the Court has recalled that child labour could not be
eliminated without tackling the underlying poverty and suggested
ensuring work for an adult member of the family in lieu of the
child or, if this is impossible within the limits of the economic
capacity of the state, the provision of a minimum income to the
family in order to enable them to send the child to school. This
should be payable as long as the child attends school.45
41 ILO-IPEC Highlights of 1998, International Labour Organization – International
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva, October 1998, p. 6.
42 Atchoarena, D. & Hite, S. – Training Poorly Educated People in Africa, Document
prepared for the International Labour Office (ILO) by the International Institute for
Educational Planning, Paris, April 1999, p. 65.
43 Haspels, N. et al. – Action against child labour: Strategies in education. Country
experiences in the mobilization of teachers, educators and their organizations in
combatting child labour, ILO-IPEC, Geneva, May 1999, p. 41.
44 ILO-IPEC – Action against child labour: The role of education, A briefing paper
produced for Consortium Meeting on Secondary Education, Paris, 10 – 11 June 1999,
p. 10.
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4.3 Violence against children, violence by children
War is not seen as a gender issue although boys are
disproportionately affected by their socialization into the role
of combatants. Throughout history, schooling contributed to
the militarization of boys. Participation in warfare was a part
of traditional initiation rituals, through which boys become
men, for millions of boys. Glorification of war continues
through those school textbooks which are dotted with wars
and war heroes, through the promotion of violent sports, and
the almost limitless commercialization of computerized war
games. Education for war has, unfortunately, a much longer
tradition and is more commercially attractive than education
for peace.
Nevertheless, education is commonly discussed in
quantitative terms. In countries which have just undergone
warfare, pleas for education in the name of returning to normal
life often means reverting to pre-war education. The extent to
which education actually contributed to warfare is questioned
only if extreme examples of advocating genocide are identified.
Otherwise, schooling is assumed to have been benign. Some-
times, it was even non-existent. If it existed, it might have
contributed to the militarization of boys.
In providing humanitarian aid, an important obstacle to
including education is a view that education is not
indispensable for human survival nor required for
subsistence. The absence of education for victims of armed
conflicts and disasters dooms them to remain recipients of
assistance while preventing them from becoming self-
sustaining. Water, sanitation, medical services, shelter,
clothing and food constitute the ‘survival package’ which is
offered through humanitarian relief. Including education in
this package is a development of the 1990s, but overcoming
the previous ‘ideology of survivalism’ has yet to become
institutionalized.
Where schooling is available, it can deny rather than
promoting the best interests of each child. Educational
curricula can be designed with a view to those children who
will continue to higher education, thus failing those who
cannot do so. The contents can be imported from far-away
countries and be incomprehensible in the local circumstances.
Methods of teaching can rely on force and violence. In the
words of Peter Newell, ‘discipline, at home or at school, which
deliberately hurts or humiliates children, especially from
adults they love and respect, teaches first the acceptability of
violence.’46
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has examined
the interplay between different, sometimes conflicting,
demands upon education – to reconcile collective and
individual rights, the rights of parents and the rights of child-
ren, the government’s commitment to the parental right to
educate their children in accordance with their religious
beliefs, to translating the right to freedom from violence from a
constitutional guarantee into a rule of conduct for schools.
Highlights from its judgment are presented in Box 6.
46 Newell, P. – No nostalgia for corporal punishment, The Independent, 5 January 1994.
45 Supreme Court of India – Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, Judgment of 10 Decem-
ber 1996, (1996) 6 SCC 756; AIR 1997 SC 699; (1997) 2 BHRC 258.
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The central question in this matter is: when
Parliament enacted a law to prohibit
corporal punishment in schools, did it
violate the rights of parents of children in
independent schools who, in line with their
religious convictions, had consented to its
use?
In support of its contention that
parents have a divinely imposed
responsibility for the training and upbringing
of their children, the appellant ... contends
that corporal punishment is a vital aspect of
Christian religion and that it is applied in the
light of its biblical context using biblical
guidelines which impose a responsibility on
parents for the training of their children. It
has further claimed that according to the
Christian faith, parents continue to comply
with their biblical responsibility by
delegating their authority to punish their
children to their teachers.
In an affidavit submitted on behalf of
the respondent, the Director-General of the
Box 6
Towards freedom from violence for all school children
Department of Education contends that
corporal punishment in schools is contrary to
the Bill of Rights. ... According to the
affidavit, corporal punishment is inherently
violent, and involves a degrading assault
upon the physical, emotional and
psychological integrity of the person to
whom it is administered. South Africans have
suffered, and continue to suffer a surfeit of
violence.
It is clear from the above that a
multiplicity of intersecting constitutional
values and interests are involved in the
present matter – some overlapping, some
competing. The parents have a general
interest in living their lives in a community
setting according to their religious beliefs,
and a more specific interest in directing
the education of their children. The child,
who is at the centre of the inquiry, is
probably a believer, and a member of a
family and a participant in a religious
community that seeks to enjoy such
freedom. Yet that same child is also an
individual person who may find himself ‘at
the other end of the stick’ and as such be
entitled to [constitutional protection].
Then, the broad community has an interest
in reducing violence wherever possible and
protecting children from harm. The overlap
and tension between the different clusters
of rights reflect themselves in
contradictory assessments of how the
central constitutional value of dignity is
implicated. On the one hand, the dignity of
the parents may be negatively affected
when the state tells them how to bring up
and discipline their children and limits the
manner in which they can express their
religious beliefs. The child who has grown
up in the particular faith may regard the
punishment, although hurtful, as designed
to strengthen his character. On the other
hand, the child is being subjected to what
an outsider might regard as the indignity of
suffering a painful and humiliating hiding
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deliberately inflicted on him in an
institutional setting. Indeed, it would be
unusual if the child did not have ambiva-
lent emotions.
The respondent has established that
the prohibition of corporal punishment is
part and parcel of a national programme to
transform the education system to bring it
into line with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. The creation of uniform norms
and standards for all schools, whether public
or independent, is crucial for educational
development. A coherent and principled
system of discipline is integral to such
development.
The state is further under a
constitutional duty to take steps to help
diminish the amount of public and private
violence in society generally and to protect
all people and especially children from
maltreatment, abuse or degradation. More
specifically, by ratifying the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, it
undertook to take all appropriate measures
to protect the child from violence.
Courts throughout the world have shown
special solicitude for protecting children
from what they have regarded as the
potentially injurious consequences of their
parents’ religious practices. It is now widely
accepted that in every matter concerning
the child, the child’s best interests must be
of paramount importance.
Section 12 of the Constitution now
adds to the rights protected by the interim
Constitution the following provisions: ...
Everyone has the right ... to be free from all
forms of violence ... It should be noted that
these rights to be violence-free are
additional to an not substitutes for the right
not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or
degrading way. Under section 7(2) the state
is obliged to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’
these rights. It must accordingly take
appropriate steps to reduce violence in
public and private life. Coupled with its
special duty towards children, this obligation
represents a powerful requirement on the
state to act.
As part of its pedagogical mission, the
Department [of Education] sought to
introduce new principles of learning in terms
of which problems were solved through
reason rather than force. In order to put the
child at the centre of the school and to
protect the learner from physical and
emotional abuse, the legislature prescribed
a blanket ban on corporal punishment. ...
The ban was part of a comprehensive
process of eliminating state-sanctioned use
of physical force as method of punishment.
The outlawing of physical punishment in the
school accordingly represented more than a
pragmatic attempt to deal with disciplinary
problems in a new way. It had a principled
and symbolic function, manifestly intended
to promote respect for the dignity and
physical and emotional integrity of all
children.47
47 Constitutional Court of South Africa – Christian Education South Africa v.
Minister of Education, Case CCT 4/00, judgment of 18 August 2000, full text
available at http://www.concourt.gov.za.
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The lead by the Constitutional Court of South Africa
towards making education violence-free, highlighted in Box
6, closes a gap in the human rights rationale against
violence in education. The traditional focus in human rights
on the protection against abuse of power by the government
relies on self-policing by governments themselves,
individually and collectively. The existing international
standards represent a patchwork while domestic approaches
vary a great deal. Some governments recognize their obliga-
tion to guarantee individual security and/or safety, others
accept only some limits upon resort to violence by the
agents of the state. Violence by non-state actors is addressed
as a variety of different and unrelated phenomena – racial
(or racist) violence, or violence against women, or
communal violence, with child abuse occasionally raised to
prominence to then disappear again from the public
agenda. What governments should – or should not – do to
prevent victimization, including by ‘normalization’ of
violence at home, in school, in the media, or through
computer games, is fiercely discussed but no shared ap-
proach is emerging. The common approach is often
combating violence with violence, for which the proverbial
examples are death penalty for homicide or corporal
punishment of school children lest they would continue to
be – or become – violent.
Violence has appeared on the human rights agenda in
its different manifestations, ranging from arbitrary
executions and death penalty to football hooliganism and
child abuse. Calls to recognize a right to violence-free life
illustrate desires to extend human rights further. Thus the
Declaration on Violence against Women included, in an
early draft, a ‘right to violence-free private and family
life,’48  which does not appear in its final text. Such a right
was, however, written into the Inter-American Convention
on Violence against Women, which declares that ‘every
women has the right to life free of violence.’49  In 1993, the
General Assembly of the United Nations, responding to
information on widespread killings of street children,
recognized that all children have the right to ‘freedom from
violence and harassment.’50  Attention of the United Na-
tions subsequently shifted to violence by not only against
children.
The mass media are often accused of glorifying violence,
sometimes also of nudging people, particularly children, to
imitate the violence portrayed on TV screens or computer
games. A hypothesis that violent behaviour results from
exposure to violence has been subjected to empirical
verification many times, especially for children, yielding
mutually contradictory outcomes. A middle-of-the road view
holds that ‘exposure to images of brutality could turn an
already disturbed child towards violence. At the very least,
48 Division for the Advancement of Women – Background material on international
action relevant to a draft declaration on violence against women, 28 August 1992, p. 6.
49 Organización de los Estados Americanos – Convención interamericana para prevenir,
sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer (Convención de Belem do Para),
adopted on 6 June 1994, Article 3, Doc. OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.3115/94 rev.2, 9 June 1994.
50 United Nations – Plight of street children, General Assembly resolution 48/136 of
20 December 1993, preamble.
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such images may give a child a picture of how it might vent
its rage,’51  and thus may lead to copycat violence.
In some countries, children are protected from excessive
exposure to violence. The Constitutional Court of Germany has
explained the need to prevent children from access to harmful
material by focusing on ‘all printed matter, films, or pictures
that glorify violence or crime, provoke racial hatred, glorify war,
constitute [moral] harm and thus may lead to serious or even
irreversible injury.’52  This has led to heightened criteria for
scrutiny for children than for adults. It is useful to recall that
the German Criminal Code prohibits the production or dis-
semination of material that describes ‘cruel or inhuman acts of
violence against human beings in a manner expressing
glorification or intentional minimization of such acts of violence
or demonstrating the cruel or inhuman acts in a manner
injuring human dignity.’53  This example is an exception to the
widespread marketing of violent films and games to children.
Violence is not only films and games for too many
children but a part of life. Children committing atrocities
have attracted much international attention because the
phenomenon seemed to have become institutionalized in
the 1990s, especially in Sierra Leone from which Civilian’s
story is reproduced in Box 7. A child who was trained to kill
following orders at the age of nine is at school three years
later, with uncertain prospects. The journalist interviewing
him was keen on finding out what the boy felt. He failed.
Maybe the boy thinks about violence as films-and-games,
maybe he is preventing himself from feeling anything,
except when the military comes along and he has a
hysterical attack.
51 We must protect young minds, The Independent, 26 November 1993.
52 Judgment in the Nudist Magazine case of 23 March 1971, reproduced from:
Kommers, D.P. – The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany,
1989, p. 423–424.
53 Section 131 of the Criminal Code, reproduced from: Harfst, G. and Schmidt, O.A.
– German Criminal Law, 1989.
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In the second classroom on the right, a
place with no glass in the windows nor even a
light bulb in the ceiling, children are
chanting in English:”How many days make a
week? Seven days make one.” and Richard
asks a boy of 12 to step out and meet me.
Sulaiman Kamara, his name is. But here
they all call him Civilian. He fought in the
war on the side of the rebels. He says he
killed a lot of people. How many, I ask –
three, four? Ten? Twenty, even? Twenty-five?
Civilian thinks about it for a moment,
and I guess that he is not calculating the
total but wondering what the effect will be
when he says it out loud. The effect on me,
the effect on him. Finally, he puts a number
to his thoughts. “I killed fifty people. More
than 50.”
Box 7
What can education do for ex-child soldier nicknamed Civilian?
WE sit on a bench in an empty
classroom whose ceiling bears obscene
graffiti left behind by the rebels. The story
Civilian tells is spellbindingly awaful. First, I
ask about his recruitment.
“The rebels came into town and
displayed what they had. Drinks, a lot of food
and vehicles. Some of my friends said, ‘Let’s
go and see what is happening.’ We went
round to have a look and that was when we
all got caught.”
He describes how he was truned into a
soldier, aged nine. “When they captured
us, the rebel commander took us into the
bush by force. He asked that we be
trained. They started training us by giving
us a gun. They pointed at a certain area of
the gun that I had to pull on. When I pulled
on it, I heard a sound that was like ...” – he
makes the noise of a magazine loading –
“and then they asked me to press the
trigger. When I pressed it, the gun
exploded. It fired. The training was to do it
again and again. Fire again and again.
Then we used the gun on somebody.”
The victim was a man accused of
supplying arms to the government forces.
“They captured him,” Civilian explains.”They
told me what he had done. They told me to
shoot him in the legs. So I took the gun and
shot him there. He could not scream
because him mouth was taped up.”
It is all so matter of fact. Civilian says
he felt nothing himself because he had been
given marijuana, and had become ‘sleepy’ as
he discharged the bullet into the man’s body.
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I wonder how much he feels now. There is no
emotion showing.
Sitting opposite me, Civilian continues.
His story darkens further. “When I joined the
rebels, the commander killed his own
parents in my presence. And he said that we
should do likewise. We should not have
sympathy for anybody. The rebels then killed
my own mother and father.”
The boy was asked if there were any
other members of his family in the area. His
grandparents, he said. So he was told to kill
them. He explained, “I went to their house
and met my grandfather first. He was
preparing to go for prayers. I said ‘Grandfat-
her, we have been told that we should not
spare anybody we meet, and this time there
is no sympathy.’ And I shot him in the back.”
His grandfather fell down, dying. Civilian
says, “He shouted,’Oh, my son, why do you
want to kill me?’ And I told him, ‘I’m not your
son, don’t call me your son,’ and I gave him
another shot and he died. And then I went
into the house. There I met my grandmother
praying and then I shot her. She was blind.”
She was blid. While I reflect on the
words, Civilian has made a circle with his
thumb and forefinger and is blowing invisible
bubbles around the room, his lips
raspberrying them into life.
“How do you feel now, when you look
back?”
He shrugs at my question, always the
child.”Now I just pray,’Father God, have
mercy on me, forgive me. I’m not going to do
it again. I pray and ask God to have mercy on
me.” I search for feeling in his words, but
still cannot hear any.
It’s difficult to know how to react to
what this young boy is saying. The first
60 Vine, J. – Rebels without a cause, High Life, September 1999, p. 34–35.
response is disbelief – he must be making
the story up to get attention. But he has had
precious little of that, and Richard Cole
assures me that the young boy’s account is
perfectly credible because, he says, it is
actually unremarkable.
Unremarkable? “Yes, because so many
boys and girls have been put in this situa-
tion,” Cole says. He explains why the boy got
the nickname Civilian – when he first came
to the school, if he ever say a person in
uniform he would become hysterical.”We all
had to run up to him, shouting,’Civilian,
Civilian, you are Civilian’ to calm him
down.”60
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54 Will, G.F. – Violence is a ‘preventable disease,’ International Herald Tribune, 28–
29 November 1992.
55 Woollacott, M. – Terrorism and the warfare of the weak, Guardian Weekly, 7
November 1993.
56 Reichenberg. D. and Friedman, S. – Traumatized children. Healing the invisible
wounds of children in war: A rights approach (The contribution of UNICEF), in:
Danieli, Y et al. (eds.) – International Responses to Traumatic Stress, Baywood
Publishing Company, Amityville/New York, 1996, p. 315.
A multitude of research projects has been devoted to
identifying the cause of violence, based on an assumption that
‘violence is a preventable disease’.54  Seeking a cure, a simple
remedy, often follows such a diagnosis. This follows from the
implicit assumption that violence can be explained, its causation
described, types of perpetrators profiled, and subsequently
violence can be eliminated. Education is seen as a key, especially
for children. However, ‘where violence is a means not of expressing
identity, but of creating it,’55  as may well have been Civilian’s fate,
there does not seem to be a ready-made answer.
The routine response of governments to children involved in
violence is to treat them as if they were adults. As a consequence,
our laws and policies fail to respond to the fact that children can
resort to violence but remain children, regardless of what they
may have done. A departure from this approach was triggered by
the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 and the
decade-long negotiations of its Protocol on child soldiers, summed
up by Dita Reichenberg and Sara Friedman as the need to address
‘all contributing causative factors’56  in trying to help children
scarred by warfare, including child soldiers.
For children such as Civilian, prospects are pretty much
dependant on luck. This boy is too young to stand trial for
killing fifty people, as he seems to freely admit, since the
lowest age to hold children legally responsible in the existing
proposals is fifteen. His prospects for getting education
depend on the funding which his current school can secure.
The government has committed itself to provide free
education to children only for the first three years of primary
school,57  which is likely to leave too many out of school. If
Civilian is lucky and continues going to school, his education
should be directed to ‘fostering respect for human rights’ as
well as his preparation of ‘responsible life in free society,’58  as
international human rights treaties require. If this turns out
to be the case, he may well encounter the first verse of this
poem:
If children were to decide, there would be no hatred
in the world, and all people would agree that war
remain only a word.59
57 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add. 116, 2000.
58 Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child, Article 11 (2) (b) and (d).
59 This poem was written by Zljok Sabol, a Slovenian school child, and translated by
Majda Celik. Reproduced from: Reardon, B.A. – Tolerance – The Threshold of Peace.
Primary-school Resource Unit, UNESCO Publishing, Paris, 1997, p. 83.
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The next step: Human rights in education
It is easy to imagine children happily agreeing that war should
remain only a word in a violence-free school, coming from a
loving family and a prosperous community. For children like
Civilian, war was and remains the reality, and ‘violence-free’ is
only a word. What education could do for him is an open
question, much as whether he did – and will – have much of it.
Those children who do have access to schooling may not
get the education that would encompass cherishing peace or
respecting human rights. They may be sitting in a class with
over a hundred other children, taught by an overworked and
underpaid teacher, beaten each time they fail to do their sums
properly. An assumption that getting children to attend school
equals the realization of their right to education thus often
conflicts with reality.
Primer No. 4 looks into human rights in education, arguing
that schooling does not necessarily amount to education. It
summarizes how human rights in education should be
safeguarded, acknowledging that in many countries they are not
recognized as yet. Our failure to secure schooling for all children
tends to focus our attention on the needed but lacking funds
and schools, keeping us focused on the means. Securing the
means does not automatically mold education towards desired
ends, provided that there was a global agreement on what
education is for. The field of human rights is a rare exception in
having defined both the ends and the means of education hence
there is a legal framework to guide education
Discussing human rights in education is thus necessary.
Without a clear vision of the inter-relationship between the
right to education and rights in education, promoting human
rights education or human rights through education remains
impossible. What happens in schools is seldom examined
through the human rights lense, the most important reason
being that the notion of rights in education is new. Evidence of
abuses of education and in education is not systematically
collected and remains largely unknown and facilitates the
perpetuation of abuses.
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